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PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE.
DURING the early years of the Health Service damages awarded in the courts
for negligence increased to an alarming degree. There were at least three factors
contributing to this state of affairs-the introduction of free legal aid, certain
changes in the law relating to the liabilities of hospitals for the negligence of
their staffs, and a perhaps understandable view by the general public that damages
were now coming "off a broad back." Since 1953, however, it seems to have
become less easy to recover damages; there have been a number of judicial
opinions expressed recently which are encouraging to the medical profession, to
the effect that a doctor should not be held liable for negligence merely because
some mishap occurs.
Professional negligence can be defined in a number of different ways, but a
simple definition is failure to exercise a reasonable degree of skill and care during
the treatment of a patient. The law imposes on certain persons a duty to take
care, and a doctor is one of them; once he undertakes the responsibility of treating
a patient he assumes "a duty of care," and in law he will be expected to attain
the standard of a reasonably skilful and careful member of his profession. Most
cases will be judged on their own merits. For instance, a consultant practising
in his own speciality wvill be held liable for negligence in respect of treatment
which in a general practitioner or a junior member of the profession might be
regarded as quite satisfactory; his standards must be those of a reasonably skilful
and careful consultant.
It also seems fairly definite that all doctors, and particularly those who specialise,
will be expected to keep abreast of modern developments and new techniques.
It is unlikely that any one of us will be liable if damage could have been averted
only after reading a particular article in a medical journal, but we would be
expected to know, for example, if a drug or clinical method had been tried out
and found to carry special dangers or disadvantages. We are, of course, entitled
to adopt our own methods of treatment even if they do not meet with universal
approval, so long as they are approved by a substantial proportion of our
colleagues and are carried out with reasonable skill and care.
What of the cases in which we fail? In parts of the United Kingdom the
general public seem to have reached the point where they feel that to be treated
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very disturbing if it should ever reach the stage (as it is reported to have in
parts of the U.S.A.) where failure to diagnose twins or deliver successfully a
breech might lead to litigation. I sometimes wonder whether we ourselves are
not to some extent to blame when a patient is dissatisfied with the results of the
treatment; a little more time spent in explaining that a proposed operation or
line of treatment will not necessarily cure or even relieve her symptoms is usually
time well spent. But there are some grains of comfort for us in the pertinent if
rather highly coloured observations on this subject made a few years ago by
Lord Justice Denningl -
"I ought to tell you what the law is on this matter of negligence against doctors and
hospitals. On the roads or in a factory there ought not to be any accidents if everyone
uses proper care, but in a hospitaL no matter what care you use, there is always some
risk. Every surgical operation involves risk. It would be wrong, and indeed bad law, to
say that simply because a misadventure or mishap occurred, thereby the hospital and the
doctors are liable. Negligence against a doctor is for him like unto a dagger. His
professional reputation is as dear to him as his body, perhaps more so, and an action for
negligence can wound his reputation as severely as a dagger can his body. You must
not, therefore, find him negligent simply because something happens to go wrong, as,
for instance, if one of the risks inherent in an operation actually takes place or because
some complications ensue which lessen or take away the benefits that were hoped for,
or because in a matter of opinion he makes an error of judgement. You should only find
him guilty of negligence when he falls short of the standard of a reasonably skilful medical
man. In short, when he is deserving of censure-for negligence in a medical man is
deserving of censure."
Certain changes have recently been made in the law concerning the liability
of hospitals for their medical staffs. Before the Health Service Act was passed
it was generally accepted that the only duty undertaken by the governors of
public hospitals towards a patient was to use due care in selecting their medical
staffs. The relationship of master and servant did not exist between the governors
and the physicians and surgeons who gave their services at the hospitals. Nurses
and others when assisting at operations ceased for the time being to be the servants
of the governors; they took their orders during that period from the surgeon
alone, and only very occasionally was a nurse held liable for anything which went
wrong. This principle was established as long ago as 1909 in a case which involved
St. Bartholomew's Hospital.2
More recently there has been quite a marked change in this aspect of the law,
and the first milestone was probably the case of Gold v. Essex County Council
in 1942.3 In this case a competent radiographer was found to have been pro-
fessionally negligent. He was at the time a whole-time employee of the hospital,
and the management committee, as his employers, were held to be liable for his
negligence even when he was engaged on work which involved the exercise of
professional skill.
This decision was extended in 1951 to apply also to doctors and surgeons.4
It was held that liability must depend on who employs the doctor or surgeon.
If the patient himself selects or employs the doctor or surgeon the hospital
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Iauthority cannot be held liable for his negligence because he is not employed
by it. But where the doctor or surgeon, be he a consultant or not, is employed
and paid not by the patient but by the hospital authority, then the authoritv may
be liable for his negligence in treating the patient.
There is certainly no longer any question that the employing authority is
responsible for the acts of their resident medical staff. But so far as part-time
consultants are concerned there is probably still an element of doubt about the
position; it is possible that some distinction will still be drawn, as it was in the
past, between contracts for service (i.e., consultants) and contracts of service
(i.e., house officers). However, the trend of legal decision recently seems to
indicate quite clearly that the doctrine of vicarious responsibility5 (responsibility
delegated by the employing authority) will also be applied to consultants, whether
part-time or whole-time. It is interesting to note how the attitude of the Ministry
of Health in London has already changed. About 1952 Regional Boards were
instructed by the Ministry not to undertake the legal defence of any member of
their medical staffs involved in a legal action. If it seemed likely that a hospital
would be involved in the alleged negligence of a doctor the Boards were advised
to bring the doctor into the action in order to obtain a contribution from him
in respect of any damages awarded. Two years later the Medical Defence Union,
in concert with other protection societies and the British Medical Association,
were able to reach agreement with the Ministry and so bring the system to an
end. In a recent report6 the Medical Defence Union say that this has been a
great step forward because it has resulted in a more frequent presentation of a
united front by hospital authorities and the protection societies; and that it has
gone some way towards eliminating the feeling that lay administrators seem more
concerned with "passing the buck" or in settling out of court than in contesting
unjustifiable claims. The obvious danger in this arrangement, to which attention
was drawn at the time, is that in cases where the hospital authority alone is sued
and the conduct of the defence left to the authority the interests of the medical
men concerned may be insufficiently considered. So far, however, the Medical
Defence Union feel that this has not happened.
Another possible consequence which still causes a good deal of concern in
Scotland (where the law is slightly different) is that if a court rules that a
consultant is the "servant" of the hospital authority, this may lead to various
undesirable sequelxe such as the issue of clinical directives. In fact, what the courts
have so far held is that we are "agents" or "delegates" but not servants.
Furthermore, it seems that these words have little exact meaning in law and
contain no implication of any power to dictate on clinical matters. Indeed, in
one of the judgements7 made about three years ago it was stated quite clearly
that, in the view of the court, ijt is not open to a hospital authority to do any
such thing, even if it were so desired.
CONSENT FOR OPERATION.
In gynxcological practice it is not uncommon to be confronted by a patient
requesting sterilisation. There seems little doubt that if there is a good medical
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the sole reason is that the couple wish to avoid having anly more children the
legality of sterilisation is much more doubtful. Karminski anid Reeve8 state that
they are aware of no authority to support the view that it is illegal provided
the usual safeguards of written consent from both husband and wife are obtained.
On the other hanid, just a few years ago the medical protection societies9 thought
it advisable to obtain a fresh opinion from counsel on the matter, and this was
given to the effect that sterilisation on eugenic grounds alone is illegal, and I
suspect that this would include purely social and domestic issues also; it is not
so if there are valid therapeutic reasons and a second opinion is obtained. Some
of us at one time or another, when faced by a husband adamant that his wife
should be sterilised, may have taken refuge in the time-honoured suggestion that
it would be much easier if he were sterilised. This approach to the problem will
sometimes have its salutary effect, but in fact sterilisation of the husband is of
very doubtful legality even when supported by the full consent of both parties
concerned unless it is performed for some specific indication such as insanity.
Perhaps the most difficult decisions relating to consent are those which arise
during laparotomy, often quite unexpectedly. We may well wonder to what
extent we are free to use our discretion regarding the removal of tubes, ovaries,
and the uterus, and to what extent the usual consent form signed before
laparotomy gives us complete carte-blanche to do what seems best. Before the
days of the Health Service it may have been quite reasonable to believe that if
a patient came to hospital either on her doctor's advice or on her own initiative
she was deemed to agree to receive treatment, but unfortunately this cannot be
said to hold good in law today.10 Consent must be "full, free, and valid in all
respects." To secure it we must make known to the patient what we propose to
do and what the possible consequences are-often no easy matter to put into
words. There is at least one interesting example of the type of legal tangle in
which we can find ourselves unless we are very carefulll:-
This was the case of a patient on whom a bilateral oophorectomy was performed. She
alleged that she had expressly forbidden the removal of both ovaries, although she had
consented to the removal of one of them. The case was in the end contested successfully,
but not so very easily, on the grounds that the operation had been left to the gyniecologist's
discretion, based on the results of exploration; that the double oophorectomy was necessary
in order to prolong the patient's life, if not to enable her to escape imminent danger; and
that the cause of tier sterility was not the operation but the cystic condition of the
ovaries at and preceding operation.
Legal opinion stresses the importance of having a clear statement that the scope
of the operation will be left to the discretion of the surgeon after he has gained
full information. The subject is dealt with in some detail by Taylor,12 who goes
so far as to state that if a surgeon finds he must exceed the limits of pre-operative
permission he should consult with the nearest relative or else be able to rely on
the extreme necessity of the case before proceeding. As always, the value of a
second opinion is emphasised. In our Ulster provincial hospitals another
gynccological opinion is seldom less than thirty miles away; when in doubt I
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who see perhaps most of the surgical game one can scarcely doubt that their
opinions would count as much in law as in every-day practice.
Biopsy DIAGNOSIS.
It is surprising to find little reference in writings on the subject of negligence
to the support which I believe we can also get from our pathologists. While in
Canada recently I was impressed by the emphasis placed on the routine patho-
logical examination of all tissues removed at operation; indeed it was an absolute
rule in most hospitals. There is no doubt that some of this insistence came from
"Tissue Committees" intent on reducing unnecessary surgery, but there was a
medico-legal motive as well. TIhe taking of vaginal smears for cytological
examination as a matter of "office routine" was also stressed as being a sensible
precaution because it seems that the stage has now been reached in some parts
of the U.S.A. at which, if an early uterine cancer is missed, failure to have taken
a smear can be construed as negligence.
Failure to take a biopsy has, of course, been the subject of litigation in England,
and it is interesting to recall the details of two such cases13:
One of these concerned a hysterectomy performed by a wonman gynxcologist, the
patient being a doctor. Some time after the operation the patient's marriage broke up
and she attributed this to the hysterectomy which she claimed had been unnecessary. It
seems that the gynxcologist had carried out diagnostic curettage, considered the
endometrium on macroscopic examination to be malignant, and had proceeded with the
hysterectomy. Subsequent histological examination showed that the endometrium was
not in fact malignant. The gynecologist eventually won the case. She contended that her
colleague had asked her to use her discretion and proceed with hysterectomy if the
curettings appeared suspicious, rather than subject her to a second anzsthetic.
The other case is also well known. An American businessman, while in England in
1942, developed acute urinary retention. The surgeon, after opening the bladder, found, on
careful manual and visual examination, what he concluded was an inoperable prostatic
cancer. The patient was told the exact diagnosis so that he could return to America and
settle his affairs. There it was found that the mass in question was not malignant, and
it was in fact removed successfully.
An action was brought for negligence, one of the grounds being the surgeon's failure
to take a specimen of the presumed carcinoma for biopsy. Mr. Justice Birkett held that
the surgeon had been negligent in not making a microscopical examination, and that he
had been lacking in his duty in taking no step to check or verify his diagnosis. Judgement
was entered against the surgeon for the sum of £6,300. On appeal, Mr. Justice Askwith
held that a doctor was not liable in negligence by reason only that he made a mistake
in diagnosis. The surgeon had maintained that his failure to take a biopsy had been a
deliberate decision after prolonged thought, that to have taken a biopsy would have
carried some risk, and that what he had done had been in accordance with established
medical practice. He was cleared completely of negligence and no damages were awarded;
but we should perhaps remember that this case was heard sixteen years ago and it might
now be much more difficult to substantiate failure to take a biopsy from any organ if
there were the slightest suspicion that it might be malignant.
While preparing this address I frequently felt I was very much the amateur
trying to interpret the work of professionals; my object has been to stimulate
your interest without, I trust, giving the impression that I am in any way an
28expert. British law has always been "the legislative expression of public opinion"
and as such it is never static; its complexities are in the long run best left to those
who profess to be experts.
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